Extradition - Denial of Asylum - Withholding Deportation - Different Tactics Used by the Attorney General to Deliver Provisional Irish Republican Army Members to the British: Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) by Roebuck, William
EXTRADITION-DENIAL OF ASYLUM-WITHHOLDING
DEPORTATION-DIFFERENT TACTICS USED BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL TO DELIVER PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
MEMBERS TO THE BRITISH: Doherty v. United States, 908
F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990)
I. FACTS
On May 2, 1980, Joseph Patrick Doherty and three other members
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA"),' at the direction
of the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), set up an ambush in a private
home in Belfast, Northern Ireland. 2 The target of the ambush was
a convoy of British soldiers.3 In the ensuing gun battle, a British
Army officer was killed. Doherty was arrested, charged with murder,
and put on trial in Belfast. He later escaped with seven others from
a maximum security prison before a decision was announced. The
court convicted him in absentia of murder and lesser crimes and
sentenced him to life imprisonment .4
With the help of the PIRA, Doherty fled to the Republic of Ireland
and eventually entered the United -States illegally in February 1982.1
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") Agents
arrested him on June 18, 1983, at a bar in New York City where
he had been working. 6
Doherty's status in this country has been the subject of extended
litigation since his arrest in 1983. 7 He has been incarcerated in a New
. PIRA is a radical offshoot of the IRA. The separation occurred at a Sinn
Fein Conference in Dublin in December, 1969 as the result of division within the
IRA over the extent to which violence should be used to achieve their objectives.
See Note, The 1985 U.S. - U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty: A Superfluous
Effort? 12 B.C. INT'L. & ComP. L. REV. 302 n.10 (1989).






I There are four published court opinions: Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938 (2d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. .1985); and Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp.
270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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York City jail since his arrest, pending disposition of his case. 8
The United States Government filed a petition for Doherty's
extradition 9 and, at about the same time, the INS initiated deportation
proceedings against him.' 0 The latter action prompted Doherty to
apply for asylum and then to request that both the deportation
proceeding and the asylum request be held in abeyance until the
extradition issue was resolved." On December 12, 1984, District Judge
John E. Sprizzo ruled that Doherty's extradition was barred since
his crimes were "political offenses" within the meaning of the ex-
tradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. 2
A United States action for collateral review was dismissed for legal
insufficiency. '3
The deportation proceedings resumed in September 1986. Doherty
took advantage of a provision in the immigration statute 4 allowing
the deportable alien to choose the country to which he will be de-
ported.' 5 Doherty chose the Republic of Ireland, where he faced only
a ten year sentence (as opposed to the life sentence in the United
Kingdom). 6 He then withdrew his application for asylum. INS of-
ficials opposed Doherty's move, arguing that it would be prejudicial
to American interests not to return him to the British authorities. '7
At the hearing before an immigration Judge, Doherty prevailed, and
the INS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or
"Board"). 8
Several days later Doherty petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
and asked for immediate deportation to the Republic of Ireland. 9
8 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1110.
9 The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed the
petition for extradition on behalf of the United Kingdom. Matter of Doherty, 599
F. Supp. at 272.
10 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1111.
Id.
" Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 277. See Treaty on Extradition, June 8,
1972, United States-United Kingdom, Art. V(l)(c)(i), 28 U.S.T. 227, 229, T.I.A.S.
No. 8468 [hereinafter 1972 Treaty of Extradition or 1972 Treaty].
1 United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (collateral
review was requested because extradition decisions are not appealable directly).
" See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)
(1988) [hereinafter 1952 Immigration Act].
1 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1111.
16 Id.
17 Id.
11 Id. at 1111-12.
19 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1986).
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He claimed the government was improperly detaining him during the
appeal process to make certain he would be available for extradition
under the new Supplementary Treaty between the United States and
the United Kingdom. 20 The new treaty retroactively eliminated the
political offense exception and thereby made once again possible
Doherty's extradition to the United Kingdom. 2' The district court
denied the petition and- allowed the administrative appeal process to
continue. 22
In March 1987, the BIA unanimously upheld the immigration judge,
ruling that there was no "clear evidence" showing the deportation
to be "prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 23 The decision
then went to Attorney General Meese who had power of review over
Board decisions. 24
On December 3, 1987, before any decision was made by the At-
torney General, Doherty moved before the BIA to reopen his de-
portation proceedings in order to withdraw his designation of Ireland
as his deportation designation, to redesignate another country for
deportation, and to reapply for asylum and for withholding of de-
portation, citing changed circumstances. 25 The BIA referred the de-
cision to the Attorney General.
Attorney General Meese decided on June 9, 1988 to reject Doherty's
initial designation of the Republic of Ireland as the country of de-
portation, reasoning that such action would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States. Instead he ordered Doherty deported
directly to the United Kingdom. 26 The Attorney General remanded
to the BIA Doherty's motion to reopen.
In November 1988, the BIA voted 3-2 in favor of Doherty's petition
to reopen the proceedings in order to give him the opportunity to
apply for asylum and withholding of deportation. The BIA ruled
that the change in circumstances concerning the extradition laws of
the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom justified Doherty's
20 Id. See Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Dec. 23, 1986, United States-United
Kingdom, 24 I.L.M. 1104 [hereinafter Supplementary Extradition Treaty].
21 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d at 940.
22 Id. at 941.
Doherty v. United Sates, 908 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1990).
24 Id. at 1109.
Id. A new extradition treaty was implemented between The Republic of Ireland
and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1987, altering applicability of the political
offense exception and rendering probable Doherty's extradition from the Republic
of Ireland to the United Kingdom. Id.
26 Id.
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decision to reconsider his earlier tactical refusal of asylum. 27 The BIA
also determined that Doherty had established a prima facie case for
relief based on a well-founded fear of persecution in Northern Ire-
land.23
The Attorney General reviewed this decision at the request of the
INS. 29 On June 30, 1989, Attorney General Thornburgh disapproved
the BIA's decision and denied Doherty's motion to reopen. 0 Doherty
appealed both orders of the Attorneys General, and the appeals were
consolidated for review by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.3 '
On appeal, held, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Attorney General Meese acted within the scope of his discretion in
rejecting Doherty's request for deportation to the Republic of Ireland
since he determined that the deportation would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States, 32 but Attorney General Thornburgh
(1) applied an incorrect legal standard of "foreseeability" in judging
Doherty's new evidence, 33 (2) improperly prejudged the merits of
Doherty's claim for withholding deportation, in the absence of any
evidentiary hearing to deal with questions of fact,34 and (3) in ex-
ercising his discretion on the asylum decision, improperly relied on
the government's political and foreign policy interests, a violation of
the spirit, if not the letter of the Refugee Act of 1980.
31
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom, ratified by the United States Senate on
July 17, 1986, 36 supplemented and amended the 1972 Treaty of Ex-
tradition between the two countries.37 The Supplementary Extradition
Id. The BIA permitted reopening only for the purpose of applying for asylum
and for withholding of deportation. The BIA did not permit reopening for with-






32 Id. See 1952 Immigration Act § 243(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
13 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1115-16.
34 Id. at 1117.
1, Id. at 1121. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified
in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1980 Refugee Act].
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, supra note 20.
37 1972 Treaty of Extradition, supra note 12.
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Treaty "narrowly restrict[ed]" the "political offense exception to
extradition" contained in the 1972 Treaty of Extradition. s This ex-
ception has been generally embodied in nearly every extradition treaty.39
The Supplementary Treaty was "expressly made retroactive."' 4
The first modern formulation of the political offense exception was
in a British case, In re Castioni, in which the court defined a political
offense as a crime which was "incidental to and formed a part of
political disturbances."14' The court held that the offensive act must
be carried out "in the course of" and "in furtherance of" a wide-
spread political uprising.42 The first United States case that employed
this incidence test was In re Ezeta ' 3 in which the court denied
extradition of persons sought, finding that the acts were "committed
during the progress of actual hostilities between contending forces.""
The case law in the United States as developed from the Castioni
and Ezeta decisions shows the development of two requirements:
there must be "an uprising or other violent political disturbance at
the time of the charged offense," 41 and the charged offense must be
incidental to, in the course of, or "in furtherance of the uprising." 46
In the 1980's, the political offense exception received criticism for
weakening law enforcement efforts against terrorism.47 The criticisms
arose primarily in reaction to several IRA extradition cases.4 The
Supplementary Extradition Treaty was negotiated in response to the
M Hannay, An Analysis of the U.S. - U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
21 INT'L LAW. 925 (1987).
19 Id. at 926.
4 Id. at 936.
41 In re Castioni 11891] 1 Q.B. 149, 165. This formulation became known as the
"incidence" test.
42 Id. at 156.
41 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
- Id. at 997.
4 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. According to the court in Quinn, three reasons underlie the political offense
exception: 1) protecting against unfair trials that political rebels might get at home;
2) preserving neutrality as to other countries' internal conflicts; 3) granting refuge
to those who have fought against unjust or despotic authority. The origin of the
political offense exception can be traced to the revolutionary ideology of the new
democratic governments formed after the French and American revolutions. Id. at
793.
41 Boston College Note, supra note 1, at 313.
41 Hannay, supra note 38, at 926. The cases included: Quinn, 783 F.2d 776; In
re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. 1979); In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr.
Misc. I (S.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
19%])
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decisions in these cases which had refused extradition on the ground
that the crimes were "political offenses. ' 49
Two important policy reasons underlay the decision to exclude
serious violent crimes 0 from the political offense exception embodied
in the Supplementary Extradition Treaty. Not only did the exception
supposedly undermine the United States government's anti-terrorism
policies, but also, in a democracy (such as the United Kingdom's)
"violence should never be deemed an acceptable part of the political
process. To even permit courts in the United States to consider
political motives as justifying murder or other violent crimes showed
a lack of respect for democratic process."'"
The Refugee Act of 19802 set forth a new statutory procedure for
granting asylum to refugees.53 Section 208(a) of the 1980 Refugee Act
gives the Attorney General the discretionary power to grant asylum
- Hannay, supra note 38, at 926-27. Those decisions had embarrassed The Reagan
Administration, especially in view of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's cooperation
with U.S. officials in their efforts to combat international terrorism. See Boston
College Note, supra note 1, at 312-13 & nn. 99, 100.
" See generally article I of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty. Specified crimes
include murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault causing grievous bodily harm, kid-
napping, hijacking, and so forth.
" 132 CoNG. REc. 59147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Richard
Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), cited in Hannay,
supra note 38, at 929. Some critics of the move to eliminate the political offense
exception have argued that these policy goals could not be achieved by such a move
and that, moreover, the move posed constitutional and political threats more dan-
gerous than the threat posed by terrorism. These critics have also voiced skepticism
about how the determination would be made that a particular government was
democratic. Would, for example, strategic allies like South Korea or El Salvador
be considered democracies? Other critics have questioned whether the Supplementary
Extradition Treaty embodying this evisceration of the political offense exception was
in accord with international law, including both customary law and U.S. treaty
obligations under the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 [No. I. Amelioration
of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces of the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; No. II. For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3115,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.; No. III. Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; No. IV. Protection of Civilian
Persons in War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 June 10, 1977 U.N.
Doc.A/332/144 (1977)]. See Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense
Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POi'Y 119, 122 (1987); Bassiouni,
The Political Offense Exception Revisited, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255, 272-
73 (1987).
S2 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
,3 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 427 (1987).
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to an alien "if the Attorney General determines that such an alien
is a refugee within the meaning of Section l101(a)(42)(A) of this
Title. '" 54 The 1980 Refugee Act defines "refugee" as one who is
unable to return to his country "because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."" The
Attorney General is not required to grant asylum "to everyone who
meets the definition of refugee. Instead, a finding that an alien is a
refugee does no more than establish that the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General."' 56 Section 208(a)
was written to conform to the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees57 to which the United States had acceded.58
Section 208(a) also bound the United States to the requirements of
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 9
In a significant shift from previous United States immigration policy,
a person's status as a refugee was to be determined without regard
to political or ideological considerations. 60
The "well-founded fear" standard (for granting asylum) of section
208(a) requires only that a reasonable person in the asylum applicant's
situation would fear persecution if returned to his native country.6 1
But even with this standard, the court should bear in mind the
potentially dangerous context of the applicant's decision:62 "a rea-
sonable person could have a well-founded fear of persecution even-
where the objective reality is that the likelihood of persecution is
under 50%." The decision to deny asylum should be reversed63 where
1' 1980 Refugee Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
5 1980 Refugee Act § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
16 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428 n.5, (emphasis in original).
11 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
11 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436. "If one thing is clear from the legislative
history of the new definition of refugee and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that
one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into
conformance with the 1967 [U.N. Protocol]. . . ." Id.
19 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152.
60 See Hanson, Behind the Paper Curtain & Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Prac-
tice, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHUNGE 107, 107-08 (1978); Anker and Posner, The
Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of The Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo
L. REv. 9, 11 (1981).
61 Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1986).
62 Id.
63 Id. See also Gonzales Batoon v. INS, 791 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1986).
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there is significant doubt as to whether the appropriate standard was
applied.
Section 243(h) of the 1952 Immigration Act governs withholding
of deportation." This section provides: "The Attorney General shall
not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threat-
ened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 65 The
withholding provision of section 243(h) was a discretionary remedy6
until the 1980 Refugee Act took effect.67 The "mandatory relief"
language of the 1980 Refugee Act modified the originally discretionary
provision" and put it into conformity with the United Nations Pro-
tocol Relating to Refugees and the United Nations Convention Re-
lating to Refugees.69
The text of section 243(h) does not specify the extent of the threat
that is required to qualify the alien for withholding of deportation."
Courts have interpreted this section as embodying a different standard
of proof than the asylum provision in section 208(a). 71 The alien must
establish a "clear probability of persecution" to be eligible for with-
holding of deportation under section 243(h). 72
Though a mandatory form of relief, withholding of deportation is
statutorily restricted. If the alien participated in the "persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion," or if there are "serious
reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the United States," he is not eligible for
withholding of deportation. 73
The Attorney General has enacted regulations that allow deportable
aliens to file motions to reopen their deportation proceedings in order
64 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
65 Id.
66 Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Stays of Deportation: Section 243(h)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 69 (1976).
67 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984).
68 1980 Refugee Act § 203(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
69 Supra notes 57 and 59. Article 33.1 of the United Nations Convention states:
"No contracting state shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of race, religion, nationality ....
o Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421-22.
7 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 427, 430 (1987).
72 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 430.
73 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988).
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to request asylum or the withholding of deportation.7 4 The BIA hears
such a motion and it is subject to judicial review by United States
Courts of Appeal. 7 A motion to reopen'in order to apply for asylum
and for withholding of deportation may be denied on three inde-
pendent grounds. 76 First, the BIA may hold that the movant did not
establish a prima facie case for the "underlying substantive relief
sought. '"77 Second, the BIA may hold that the movant has not in-
troduced "previously unavailable, material evidence, ' 78 or in an asy-
lum case, has not "reasonably explained" the initial failure to apply
for asylum. 79 Third, where the relief is discretionary (excluding with-
holding of deportation), the BIA may skip the two threshold concerns
and "simply determine that even if they were met, the movant would
not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief." 80 An abuse of
discretion standard governs such denials8' by the BIA or the Attorney
General.82
Motions to reopen are disfavored in deportation proceedings, and
are analogous to motions for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence (in which the moving party bears a heavy bur-
den). 3 In addition, courts have shown special deference to INS de-
cisions because these officials "exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations. '" '
If the movant makes a prima facie case and offers new evidence/
reasonable explanation, the BIA's or Attorney General's power to
deny the motion to reopen is limited to discretionary relief, including
granting asylum. 85 The exercise of that discretion must not be "ar-
bitrary, capricious or contrary to the law.' '86 Instead, the Attorney
General should base his discretionary decisions on "legitimate
concerns ' 87 of the relevant statutes. Some courts have held that it
74 INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 96-97 (1988).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 104.
77 Id.
78 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987)).
Id. at 105 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1987)).
so Id.
81 Id. See also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985).
82 The Attorney General has the authority to review BIA decisions under 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(h).
11 Abudu, 485 U.S. at 107.
84 Id. at 110.
15 Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986).
6 Id. at 1435. See also Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105.
87 Aviles-Torres, 790 F.2d at 1437; see also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444,
451-52 (1985).
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is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to reopen where the BIA
or Attorney General has "prejudg[ed] the merits of the case, without
allowing [the movant] an opportunity to prove [the validity of his
new evidence or the reasonableness of his explanation]. "88 As for the
new evidence/reasonable explantion standard, at least one court has
found acceptable the presentation of relevant information which the
movant "did not have in his possession at the time of the deportation
hearing. "89
Since withholding of deportation is a mandatory form of relief,
courts have held that it- is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion
to reopen where the applicant has established a prima facie case for
such withholding. 90 A prima facie case raises "factual issues war-
ranting a hearing [reopening] if not an outright grant of relief." 9'
Section 243(a) of the 1952 Immigration Act gives the deportable
alien the right to select the country to which he will be deported
"unless the Attorney General in his discretion concludes that de-
portation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States. "92 The statute provides no specific guidelines as to
what constitutes "prejudice." 93 Courts have considered it to be "an
essentially political determination. "94 The alien has the right to appeal
a denial of a designated country before the BIA, 95 and then to petition
for review in the United States Courts of Appeal.9 Recent case law
has upheld the Attorney General's power not only to reject a des-
ignated country but to "name the country" to which the alien should
be deported. 97
III. ANALYsIs
The court correctly determined that Attorney General Thornburgh
abused his discretion in denying Doherty's motion to reopen his case
n Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575, 576 (10th Cir. 1983).
'9 Id. at 576.
9 Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105; see also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 518
(9th Cir. 1985).
9, Aviles-Torres, 790 F.2d at 1436. See also Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d
621, 628 (1st Cir. 1985).
92 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
93 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 943 (2nd Cir. 1986).
%Id.
9 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1986).
- 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(11) (1988).




to apply for asylum and withholding of deportation. The court also
correctly decided that Attorney General Meese acted within the scope
of his discretion in denying Doherty's designation of the Republic
of Ireland as the country of deportation.
The court properly interpreted INS v. Abudu98 in evaluating the
Attorney General's denial of Doherty's motion to reopen. Regulations
established by the Attorney General allowed Doherty to make such
a motion before the BIA. Using the Abudu framework, the court
found that the Attorney General made no determination on whether
Doherty had made a prima facie case for the underlying substantive
relief sought." For the purpose of this appeal, the court assumed
Doherty had made such a case.100
The court, rejecting the Attorney General's findings on the second
ground for denial, determined that Doherty did introduce "previously
unavailable material evidence" and "reasonabl[y] explain[ed] his fail-
ure to apply for asylum initially."'' The court reasoned that the
change in Irish extradition law and Attorney General Meese's adverse
decision on Doherty's country choice for deportation constituted new
evidence/reasonable explanation. °2 In this matter, the court was in
agreement with the BIA's initial decision that these factors represented
"changed circumstance[s] which ha[d] arisen since the hearing. 10 3
In addition to evaluating these factors on their merits and deter-
mining that they satisfied the second independent requirement for
reopening under Abudu, the court made two other convincing ar-
guments to justify rejecting the Attorney General's finding. First, it
reasoned that the BIA had also found the new evidence/reasonable
explanation credible. That was significant because the BIA "repeat-
edly deals with motions to reopen" and has a "body of informed
experience that helps it distinguish meritorious motions from those
lacking in merit.' °4 It was because of such experience that the courts
"defer to the board's [(BIA's)] decisions in most immigration mat-
ters. '" 0
" Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05.
" Since the three grounds for denial to reopen under Abudu are independent,
the Attorney General was not required to make such a determination.
10 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1990).
,0, Id. (quoting Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05).
102 Id. at 1116.
10 Id. at 1112.
, Id. at 1116.1o Id. at 1122-23. The dissent reasoned that in making this argument, the majority
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Second, the court found that the Attorney General applied an
incorrect legal standard of foreseeability in evaluating Doherty's new
evidence/reasonable explanation. Nothing in the regulations'06 or the
case law "require[d] expressly or by implication that the new evidence
be unforeseeable."'' 7 Such a standard would require a deportee to
make his case on "all foreseeable eventualities" and there "would
be no end to facts and issues potentially relevant to the case."' s
Even assuming this consequentialist argument to be exaggerated, it
seems the court is correct in pointing out that the Attorney General
applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the evidence. That
alone constituted an abuse of discretion and was grounds for re-
versal. 109
Under Abudu, the BIA or Attorney General can deny a motion
to reopen by skipping the two threshold concerns (prima facie case
and new evidence/reasonable explanation) and determining that the
movant ultimately would not be entitled to relief." 0 But the Abudu
decision limits this step to motions for discretionary relief (including
asylum). Withholding of deportation, however, is a mandatory form
of relief."' The Attorney General has no discretion on this motion
if the applicant meets the statutory requirements.' 12 Yet, the Attorney
General used this step in his decision, arguing that Doherty would
not ultimately be entitled either to the discretionary relief of asylum
or to withholding of deportation. As the Court made clear, this was
a misreading of Abudu and other relevant case law."'
ignored the unusual posture of this case; it was a decision by the Attorney General,
not by the BIA. In the dissent's view, the Court should defer to the Attorney
General's judgment even more so than to the BIA's. Id. at 1125.
I- See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987), and 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1987).
107 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1990).
103 Id.
109 Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1986) (denial of asylum
reversed where decision "leaves room for significant doubt as to whether appropriate
standard was applied"); see also Gonzales Batoon v. INS, 791 F.2d 681, 686 (9th
Cir. 1986) (denial of motion to reopen was abuse of discretion where the BIA
"misapplied the principles upon which it purported to act").
110 Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105.
11, Id.
112 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1116-17. See also Hernandez-Ortiz v.
INS, 777 F.2d 509, 518 (9th Cir. 1985) ("There are no discretionary factors the
Board is allowed to consider and use as a basis for denying relief on the merits").
" Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1116-17 (citing Aviles-Torres v. INS,
790 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (abuse of discretion to deny motion to reopen
where applicant established prima facie case for withholding of deportation)).
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The dissent made a valid argument that withholding of deportation
was only mandatory if the alien meets the statutory requirements of
section 243(h)(2). If he has committed a "serious nonpolitical crime
outside the United States" or "participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion,' 1 4 he fails to meet those
requirements. In the dissent's view, Doherty admitted to such offenses
at earlier hearings."' If that were true, the Attorney General would
have a strong case for denying the motion to reopen for withholding
of deportation. However, this argument really begs the question: Did
Doherty's offenses in Northern Ireland constitute serious non-political
offenses (as opposed to politically motivated acts) or amount to
persecution of others on account of nationality or religion? As the
majority reasoned with some cogency, "[Tihese issues all raise for-
midable questions of fact" 6 that cannot be adequately resolved in the
absence of an evidentiary record[,] [that is]. . .fully devel-
oped. .. .117 That would require reopening the case; the Attorney
General's decision not to do so, (like the dissent's argument that
disqualifying offenses have been committed), amounts to "pre-
judg[ing] the merits of Doherty's claim for withholding deporta-
tion. '"" s The court found such prejudgment as abuse of discretion," 9
and the case law supports that view. 20
"' 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988).
" Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1129.
116 These questions of fact are all the more formidable given the complexities
surrounding the political offense exception-in most extradition treaties one cannot
be extradited for political crimes-and its elimination in the Supplementary Extra-
dition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. The problem of
how one defines political crimes has spawned lengthy and complex commentary and
debate in the courts, in legal academia, and in professional bodies like the American
Bar Association. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1986)
("inability to define precisely the term 'political offense' promotes a necessary
flexibility of concept"); Note, In re Doherty: Distinguishing Terrorist Activities from
Politically Motivated Acts Under the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 1
TEMP. INT'L & Coup. L.J. 99, 101 (1985) ("The problem of determining which acts
qualify as political offenses is a growing concern in international arenas as well as
national domains"); C.V. DEN WUNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITON: Tm DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCIO THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER at xiv (1980) ("The problem of defining
the term 'political offense' [is) the elasticity of the concept [and] the ambiguity of
the concept 'political crime"').
"I Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1117.
I's Id.
119 Id.
,20 See Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575, 576 ("prejudging the merit of the case
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Contrary to withholding of deportation, asylum is a discretionary
form of relief.' 2' Consequently, the Attorney General was on more
solid ground in skipping the threshold concerns 22 and making the
decision that ultimately Doherty was not entitled to such relief.12 3
The court, however, developed a subtle yet persuasive argument,
supported by a detailed legislative history and an analysis-of United
States immigration law (especially the 1980 Refugee Act), that un-
dermined the Attorney General's argument for a straightforward
application of the Abudu framework to asylum. First, the court
reasoned that the Attorney General must base his discretionary de-
cisions only on the "legitimate concerns" of United States immigra-
tion law. 24
Second, the court reasoned that the legislative history of recent
immigration legislation showed that one of Congress' key concerns,
embodied in the 1980 Refugee Act, was to "insulate the asylum
process from the influences of politics and foreign policy, factors
that had long dominated the admissions process.' '1 25 In 1968, the
United States ratified the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. The court's argument is that Congress passed
the 1980 Refugee Act because the manner in which the Attorney
General had been using his discretionary authority under previously
existing legislation to inject ideological and geographical considera-
tions into matters concerning refugees and the granting of asylum
was preventing the United States from conforming to requirements
of the United Nations provisions. Those provisions were designed to
protect refugees from such considerations. 26 By defining eligibility
110 See Motamedi v. INS, 713 F.2d 575, 576 ("prejudging the merit of the case
and denying motion to reopen without allowing Motamedi an opportunity to prove
his case... constitutes an abuse of discretion."); Reyes v. INS, 673 F.2d 1087, 1089-
90 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The Board's premature assessment and rejection of the truth
of the facts stated in Reyes' affidavits in ruling on her motion was manifestly
unfair... and constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.").
- The granting of asylum is governed by the 1952 Immigration Act § 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
2I Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105.
123 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1117.
14 Id. (citing INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1985); Aviles-Torres v.
INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985) ("the Board in this case failed to articulate
any legitimate concerns that would justify an exercise of discretion unfavorable to
petitioner")).
"I Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1118.
'16 Id. at 1119. See also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 427 (1984) ("Elimination
of the geographic and ideological restrictions. . .was thought to bring the United
States' scheme into conformity with its obligations under the Protocol .... ").
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for asylum in the 1980 Refugee Act in "politically neutral terms,
Congress made it clear that factors such as the government's geo-
political and foreign policy interests were not legitimate concerns of
asylum.' 27
Further, in the court's view, the 1980 Refugee Act limited, but did
not eliminate, the Attorney General's discretionary authority in asy-
lum matters.1 28 Congress did not eliminate that discretionary authority
entirely because of concerns for administrative efficiency and flexi-
bility. But Congress made clear that "it intended to monitor closely
the Attorney General's implementation of the [new policy] so as to
insure the rights of those it seeks to protect.' '129 The court reasoned
that Congress could not have meant to give the Attorney General
"boundless discretion" to make asylum decisions (as the dissent
argued)'30 because it would frustrate the primary purposes of the 1980
Refugee Act.' 3'
The court then briefly reviewed the manner in which the 1980 Act
has been implemented. Aliens have received discretionary denials of
asylum for reasons of "administrative fairness and efficiency, not to
preserve our political relationship with the allegedly persecuting na-
tion.' 3 2 Although it used a complicated argument, with some involved
legislative history, the court persuasively made its point that the
Attorney General injected extraneous political considerations into his
determination that Doherty was not ultimately entitled to asylum; in
doing so he abused his discretion, as he did on the withholding of
deportation determination.
Unless this decision is overturned at an en banc hearing by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals,' 33 Doherty will have an opportunity
to argue before an immigration judge that he should be given asy-
127 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1119. See generally Anker and Posner,
supra note 60, at 1154 ("The Committee intended to emphasize that the plight of
the refugees themselves as opposed to national origins or political considerations
should be paramount....").
"I Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1120.
'29 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1979)).
130 Id.
Id. at 1121.
,'2 Id. at 1120. There have been two classes of denials: for those who have
fraudulently attempted to circumvent the overseas admissions process without suf-
ficient cause and for refugees who have found refuge in another country. Id.
,3 The Justice Department made the request for such a hearing on July 20, 1990.
Kelly, IRA Man Staves Off Extradition, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1990, § 1 at A4
(Wednesday Final Edition).
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lum. 3 This decision will no doubt influence the immigration judge's
ultimate resolution of the case.
This decision has significance beyond that level, however, for it
will reverberate through our immigration law and perhaps even impact
on the manner the United States has treated the political offense
exception in its recent decisions on treaties. This decision breaks no
new legal ground but instead probes in detail the legislative sources
and administrative practices that reveal the purpose and spirit behind
our laws on withholding of deportation and asylum. That historical
analysis will influence the way other courts address these issues. It
will serve to remind both the legal community and the government
that in the contemporary rush to implement an anti-terrorism policy
and to put our foreign policy and domestic law at its service, we
may have ignored some of the important sources of our laws and
some of our most valued political traditions."'
The court made the correct legal decision that Attorney General
Meese acted within the scope of his discretion in denying Doherty's
designation of the Republic of Ireland as the country of deportation.
Under section 243(a) of the 1952 Immigration Act, the Attorney
General has the authority to reject a particular country of deportation
if he determines that "deportation to such a country would be prej-
udicial to the interests of the United States."'13 6 In the absence of
any specific guidelines as to what constitutes prejudice, the Attorney
General has fairly broad authority to make that discretional judg-
ment. 37 At an earlier stage of the case, the court noted that the
statute required the Attorney General to make a "political deter-
mination" that was "essentially unreviewable."' 31 The Attorney Gen-
eral found that deporting Doherty to the Republic of Ireland would
'3,Wolff, IRA's Doherty Wins Right to Ask Asylum, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1990,
§ 1, at 25, col. 2 (Saturday late final edition).
- This can be asserted given that we have defined ourselves, in Professor Chris-
topher Pyles' words, "as a nation of immigrants and as a haven for political refugees
of all kinds." United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty:
Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 99
(1985) (prepared statement of Professor Pyles, Mount Holyoke College). See also
Blakesley, supra note 51, at 118 ("mhe elimination of the political offense exception
undermines the function of the judiciary provided by the Constitution. Questions
of fact and law, particularly concerning individual liberty, are issues for the courts.
To undermine this role, by use of a treaty or any other means, threatens the balance
within the separation of powers requirement.").
1- 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
,17 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1113.
138 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1986).
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damage our foreign relations with the United Kingdom as well as
undercut our anti-terrorism policy.3 9 As an implied power, the court
found that the Attorney General could designate the country of
deportation once he had rejected the alien's choice.'14 The court found
that Attorney General Meese made his decision based on the facts
established at the extradition proceedings rather than on outside
sources. Thus, there was no procedural error involved.
The decision on this part of the case was unanimous; if Doherty
is ultimately deported, his destination will be the United Kingdom.
This part of the decision could prove to be more significant for its
precedential value than the more disputed aspects of the decision.
There was no "directly supportive precedent" for this "implied power
decision'" 4 except for an earlier decision on the case by the same
court in Doherty v. Meese. 142 The language used in that case was
"novel and expansive' '143 and upheld the Attorney General's power
not only to deny the alien's selection of country but to then name
another country himself.'" The statute in question, section 243(a),
does state expressly that the alien "shall be permitted to make no
more than one such designation,' 14 but it does not state that the
Attorney General then has the power to make that choice for the
alien. It is odd that a court as concerned about the dangers and fears
involved in the deportation/asylum/extradition process as this court
showed itself to be in the more disputed parts of the decision (on
asylum and withholding deportation) should sanction the Attorney
General's expansive reading of the deportation statute. A more narrow
reading of the statute is arguably as appropriate: Since Congress did
not specify that the Attorney General should have the power to
designate the country following a rejected choice by the alien (as it
did in the Internal Security Act of 1950, which the 1952 Immigration
Act superseded), Congress did not intend the Attorney General to
have such broad authority. I'"
Upholding the Attorney General's authority to so act, especially
in a situation where deportation is being used as a substitute for
119 Doherty v. United States, 908 F.2d at 1113.
,,0 Id. (citing the earlier decision in Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d at 941).
' Boston College Note, supra note 1, at 326.
142 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d at 938.
,43 Boston College Note, supra note 1, at 326.
I- Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d at 941.
.4 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
"' See Boston College Note, supra note 1, at 328.
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extradition amounts to giving him power of "disguised extradition,"' 47
absent the procedural safeguards of the extradition process 14 and
would appear to be subject to administrative abuse. The courts need
to examine this issue more closely to determine if deportation law
and extradition law can enjoy such a symbiotic relationship without
jeopardizing the rights of the alien caught in the middle.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court correctly determined that Attorney General Thornburgh
abused his discretion in denying Doherty's motion to reopen for
asylum and withholding of deportation. The Attorney General used
the correct three-part test under Abudu but in the second part he
relied on an incorrect legal standard, foreseeability in examining
Doherty's new evidence/reasonable explanation. That was an abuse
of discretion. The court found that the Attorney General incorrectly
decided, with regard to withholding of deportation, that the third
part of the test allowed him to skip the threshold concerns and decide
whether Doherty was ultimately entitled to such relief. Given that
the withholding provision is a mandatory remedy, the court correctly
found that decision to be another instance of abuse of discretion.
Since asylum, in contrast to deportation, is a discretionary remedy,
the Attorney General was allowed to skip the threshold concerns in
order to determine whether Doherty was ultimately entitled to asylum.
The court found that the Attorney General based his ultimate denial
of asylum relief on foreign policy concerns. Based on its extensive
examination of the legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act and
related legislation, the court held that the Attorney General violated
the spirit of 1980 Refugee Act by injecting such concerns into his
decisions on asylum. The decision is significant because of its probing
historical analysis of recent immigration law and the effect that could
have on the United States' laws of extradition, asylum, and depor-
I4 d. at 331 (citing DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 116, at 52).
The Supreme Court had pointed out that such procedural safeguards are
necessary for the extradition process because extradition is "the surrender to another
country of one accused of an offense against its laws there to be tried and if found
guilty, punished." Deportation, on the other hand involves the removal of an alien
from a country "simply because his presence is deemed inconsistent with public
welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated, either under
the laws of the country out of which he is sent or under those of the country to
which he is taken." Id. at 330-31 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 709 (1893)).
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tation. The decision will also undoubtedly have some effect on the
outcome of Doherty's asylum hearing.
The court also made the correct legal determination that Attorney
General Meese was within his discretion in refusing Doherty's des-
ignation of the Republic of Ireland as country of deportation. Section
243(h) of the 1952 Immigration Act grants the Attorney General the
authority to make that decision. The court also found that Attorney
General Meese could then designate the country of deportation.
That is a novel and expansive reading of the statute which could
give the Attorney General the ability to use deportation as a form
of disguised extradition, without the procedural safeguards of the
extradition process. Given that such a practice would appear to be
subject to administrative abuse, the courts need to examine the issues
more closely to determine if such a practice comports with the letter
and spirit of our deportation and extradition laws. The decision also
means that if Doherty's appeals fail and he is eventually deported,
the United Kingdom will be his destination.
William Roebuck
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